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A COMPARISON OF THE CRIMINAL
APPELLATE DECISIONS OF APPOINTED
STATE SUPREME COURTS: INSIGHTS,
QUESTIONS, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
Aman L. McLeod *

Of all the systems used to select judges in the United States, appointment systems are the most widely used.1 An appointment system is one in which the state’s governor, with or without the input
of a nominating commission, chooses candidates to fill initial and
interim vacancies on a court.2 Today, a majority of the states use
appointment systems to select their supreme court judges.3 There
are many important differences in the institutional arrangements
and procedures that these appointment systems use, however, and
no research has been done to see if these differences affect the
outcome of cases.
This Article presents the results of a study conducted to see
whether state supreme courts selected in states with dissimilar appointment systems differ in the way they decide criminal appeals.
Comparing the criminal decisions of courts selected with different
* Assistant Professor of Political Science and Law, Rutgers University - Camden; Ph.D., J.D., University of Michigan; B.A., Amherst College. The author would
like to thank Carmen Adamucci, Katie Blasi, Victoria Haich, Jacob Rosoff, Danielle
Reiss, Melissa Ruggeri, and Jason Toy for their help gathering the data for this study.
The author would also like to thank Norman Greene, Russell Harrison, Bettie McLeod, Peter Palenchar, and G. Alan Tarr for their helpful comments.
1. AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE STATES 7-14 (2004),
available at http://www.ajs.org/js/JudicialSelectionCharts.pdf [hereinafter AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, JUDICIAL SELECTION].
2. Although all states use either gubernatorial appointments or legislative elections to fill interim vacancies on their highest courts, this study is only concerned with
states that use gubernatorial appointment to fill both initial and interim vacancies.
See Am. Judicature Soc’y, Judicial Selection in the States, http://www.ajs.org/js/ (last
visited Oct. 30, 2006) [hereinafter Am. Judicature Soc’y, Judicial Selection in the
States].
3. Id. The Article uses the term “supreme court” hereinafter to refer to a state’s
highest appellate court, despite the fact that in some states, the highest appellate court
is not officially called the state supreme court. For example, the official name of the
highest appellate court in New York is the New York Court of Appeals, while the
intermediate appellate court in that state is known as the New York Supreme Court,
Appellate Division.
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appointment systems may also suggest something about how different appointment systems impact judicial independence.
I.

APPOINTMENT: THE FALL AND RISE
JUDICIAL SELECTION SYSTEM

OF A

As of 1846, appointment was second the most common way of
selecting justices of the states’ highest courts.4 Of the twenty-nine
states that entered the union prior to that date, fourteen used appointment systems to select supreme court justices.5 Over the
course of the nineteenth century, however, the proportion of states
that used appointment systems for their highest courts dropped
sharply as many new states entered the union with different selection systems (typically partisan elections) and as states already in
the union switched to different selection methods.6 The change
away from appointment toward partisan election of justices was,
among other things, prompted by the belief that elected judges
would exercise their duties more independently than judges who
owed their appointments to the governor or to the legislature.7
The change was also spurred by the belief that elections would prevent the judiciary from being filled with judges who owed their appointments to political connections rather than to personal
qualifications.8 Defenders of judicial selection systems that combined appointment and life tenure retorted that elections would
undermine judicial independence by subjecting judges to the will of
the people and to manipulation by political party leaders; but these
arguments did not prevent the adoption of judicial elections in
most states during the period.9
By 1909, thirty-five of the forty-six states in the union used partisan elections to select supreme court justices. Partisan elections,
which some viewed as a means of assuring judicial independence
from the other branches of government, came under renewed criticism for being detrimental to judicial independence. Critics
claimed that elected judges were indebted to the political parties
upon whom the judges depended for electoral support and that
4. See F. Andrew Hanssen, Learning About Judicial Independence: Institutional
Change in the State Courts, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 431, 443 (2004).
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. See Kermit L. Hall, The Judiciary on Trial: State Constitutional Reform and the
Rise of an Elected Judiciary 1846-1860, 45 HISTORIAN 337, 347, 349-50 (1983) [hereinafter Kermit L. Hall, The Judiciary on Trial].
8. Id. at 346-47.
9. Id. at 341-54.
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party leaders could use their patronage powers to influence the judiciary.10 Critics also pointed out that elected judges frequently
heard cases involving attorneys and litigants who had contributed
to their campaigns, which further undermined public confidence in
the courts’ independence.11
Interest in appointment as a judicial selection method enjoyed a
revival during the 1910s in response to the previously-mentioned
problems.12 Prominent proponents of a return to appointment during this period included Roscoe Pound, John Wigmore, and Albert
Kales.13 Furthermore, the effort to encourage judicial selection reform provided one of the driving forces behind the creation of the
American Judicature Society in 1913.14 In 1914, Kales proposed an
appointment plan eventually known as merit selection, which many
reformers of the era supported.15 Kales’s idea sparked the revival
of interest in appointment as a judicial selection system. Although
various states considered several versions of Kales’s proposal
throughout the 1930s, Missouri was the first state to adopt a merit
selection plan in 1940.16 Currently, twenty-three states and the
District of Columbia use merit selection commissions to select the
judges of their highest courts.17
As a system for choosing judges, merit selection attempts to accomplish three important goals: 1) enhance the professionalism of
the judiciary, 2) enhance the independence of the judiciary, and 3)
minimize the influence of partisan politics on the judicial selection
process.18 Under a merit selection plan, candidates for a vacancy
on the bench are vetted by a commission19 composed of lawyers,
10. Paul D. Carrington, Judicial Independence and Democratic Accountability in
Highest State Courts, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 79, 91 (1998).
11. Id. at 91-92.
12. Id. at 93; Peter D. Webster, Selection and Retention of Judges: Is There One
“Best” Method?, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 29 (1995).
13. Webster, supra note 12, at 29.
14. Carrington, supra note 10, at 96.
15. Webster, supra note 12, at 29.
16. LARRY C. BERKSON & RACHEL CAUFIELD, JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE
UNITED STATES: A SPECIAL REPORT 4-5 (2005), available at http://www.ajs.org/js/
berkson_2005.pdf.
17. AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, JUDICIAL SELECTION, supra note 1, at 6.
18. See AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, MERIT SELECTION: THE BEST WAY TO CHOOSE
JUDGES 1-3, available at http://www.ajs.org/js/ms_descrip.pdf (last visited Oct. 15,
2006) [hereinafter AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, THE BEST WAY TO CHOOSE JUDGES].
19. Id. at 1. The governor generally selects commission members, but in some
states legislators, the state bar, or members of the state judiciary choose commission
members.
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non-lawyers, and sometimes sitting judges.20 After considering all
of the applicants, the commission sends a list of the candidates that
it deems most highly qualified (generally two to seven)21 to the
governor, from which the governor selects one candidate to fill a
vacancy.22 For proponents of merit selection, the use of commissions to vet candidates for judicial vacancies provides the primary
advantage over other judicial selection systems because the focus
of the candidate search remains on the professional and personal
qualifications of the candidates, while minimizing political considerations in the selection process.23
Merit selection plans are frequently combined with retention
elections as a means of re-selecting judges after their initial terms
of appointment expire. Although forcing judges to run in any type
of election introduces the possibility that they will be subject to
influence by campaign contributors,24 retention elections coupled
with merit selection ensures that judges remain accountable to the
people they serve.25 In a retention election, the incumbent judge
does not run against an opponent.26 Instead, voters decide whether
the judge should serve another term or be removed from office.27
Despite the fact that judges do not face opponents on the ballot in
retention elections, these elections can turn into expensive and bitter contests when special interest groups mount campaigns for a
judge’s removal.28
Between 1940 and 1989, twenty states29 adopted appointment
systems for selecting their supreme court justices, with fourteen of
them switching from partisan or non-partisan elections to an appointment system using a merit selection commission and retention
20. See AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, MERIT SELECTION: CURRENT STATUS 3-6
(2003), available at http://www.ajs.org/js/JudicialMeritCharts.pdf [hereinafter AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, CURRENT STATUS].
21. Id.
22. See AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, THE BEST WAY TO CHOOSE JUDGES, supra note
18, at 1.
23. Id. at 1-3.
24. See Aman McLeod, If At First You Don’t Succeed: A Critical Evaluation of
Judicial Selection Reform Efforts, 107 W. VA. L. REV. 499, 512-14 (2005).
25. See Malia Reddick, Merit Selection: A Review of the Social Scientific Literature,
106 DICK. L. REV. 729, 739-40 (2002).
26. See PHILIP L. DUBOIS, FROM BALLOT TO BENCH 4 (1980).
27. Id.
28. See, e.g., Traciel V. Reid, The Politicization of Judicial Retention Elections: Lessons from the Defeat of Justices Lanphier and White, JUDICATURE, Sept.-Oct. 1999, at
70-71.
29. See Am. Judicature Soc’y, Judicial Selection in the States, supra note 2. This
number includes Alaska and Hawaii, which entered the union in 1959.
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elections.30 The fact that so many states changed from elections to
appointment reflects the success of proponents of merit selection in
making their case that merit selection, and appointment systems
more generally, result in a more professional and independent
judiciary.
Still, substantial variation remains in how appointment systems
work in different states for filling supreme court vacancies. For example, California, Maine, New Hampshire, and New Jersey allow
the governor to make both initial and interim appointments to
their supreme courts without the use of a commission.31 Furthermore, among the states that use commissions,32 tremendous variation exists in the way that the commission members are chosen and
how they do their work. For example, in some states the governor
appoints all of the commission members, whereas in other states
the state bar, the state legislature, or the judiciary plays a role in
choosing the members.33 States that use a commission to vet applicants for judicial vacancies use procedures that vary over whether
the governor must choose a candidate from the list presented by
the commission,34 whether the legislature confirms the selected
candidate,35 and in the procedures used and factors considered by
the commissions when reviewing the candidates.36 States that use
appointment to initially select their high court judges also vary as
to whether the justices face reselection.37 When justices face
reselection, states also differ on the reselection process38 and how
long judges’ terms of office last.39 For example, most states that
use merit selection commissions to select the judges of their high
courts subject them to retention elections.40 Some states, like Massachusetts41 and Rhode Island, however, do not subject their high
30. Id.
31. See AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, JUDICIAL SELECTION, supra note 1, at 6.
32. For a full list of states that use merit selection for initial and interim vacancies,
see AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, CURRENT STATUS, supra note 20, at 3-6.
33. Id. at 8-12.
34. Id. at 13-15.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 16-19. For example, commissions differ as to the required degree of
confidentiality in their deliberations. Furthermore, some commissions must consider
the ethnic and gender diversity of the judiciary when deciding which candidates to
forward to the governor.
37. See AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, JUDICIAL SELECTION, supra note 1, at 7-14.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. Massachusetts, like other states, however, has a mandatory retirement age
for judges. Id. at 10.
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court judges to any form of reselection once appointed and confirmed. Other states, like Hawaii, require supreme court judges to
go through the commission process again when their ten-year
terms of office expire.42
II.

THE POLITICAL SALIENCE OF CRIMINAL DECISIONS
CURRENT STUDY

IN THE

Although some researchers investigated the ways in which different selection systems affect how judges decide cases, most of this
research has dealt with the differences between appointed judges
and elected judges.43 As stated earlier, there has been no research
into how courts selected with dissimilar appointment systems differ
in their decisional behavior. For example, no studies compare the
rulings of a court appointed without a commission with the rulings
of a court appointed with the help of a commission. Nor has research been conducted to see whether the manner in which judicial
appointment systems function impacts how courts decide cases.
Research into the effects of different appointment systems on
court decisions is crucial to understand how the various types of
appointment systems accomplish one of their primary goals: the
promotion of judicial independence.44 The term judicial independence refers to the ability of judges to render decisions free from
political or popular influence.45 Of course, no indisputable method
exists to scientifically measure a court’s independence or the influence by other branches of government and public or private pressure on a court’s decisions. One measurable manifestation of a
court’s independence might be its propensity to make decisions
contrary to the political interests of the judges who comprise it. If
a court’s judges are not concerned with the opinions of those who
could remove them from office, the hallmark of an independent
court, arguably that court should be more prone to issue unpopular
decisions, assuming all other factors are equal.
Accordingly, this study focuses on state supreme court decisions
in criminal cases. There is anecdotal and empirical evidence which
demonstrate that judicial decisions in criminal cases significantly
42. Id. at 8.
43. For an excellent summary of the empirical research into differences in the decisional behavior of elected and appointed judges, see Reddick, supra note 25, at 745
nn.103-08.
44. See, e.g., Carrington, supra note 10, at 91-92; Kermit L. Hall, The Judiciary on
Trial, supra note 7, at 347, 349-50.
45. See Charles Gardner Geyh & Emily Field Van Tassel, The Independence of the
Judicial Branch in the New Republic, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 31, 31 (1998).
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impact the removal of judges from the bench. Although many
other factors can lead to the removal of a judge, a reputation for
being “soft” on criminal defendants carries well-documented negative repercussions. For example, case studies indicate that a judicial reputation as pro-criminal defendant played a prominent role
in the defeats of three supreme court justices in California in
1986,46 and of supreme court justices in Tennessee and Nebraska in
1996 in retention elections.47 Other researchers noted the extreme
rhetoric that judicial candidates use in their electoral campaigns in
order to establish their anti-crime credentials.48 Furthermore,
judges who face reappointment by political officials can also be in
danger if they develop a reputation for being soft on crime.49 Such
a situation occurred in New York, when a judge on the state’s intermediate appellate court resigned after the governor informed
the judge that he would not be reappointed because of his pattern
of ruling in support of criminal defendants.50
A study of televised campaign advertisements run by supreme
court candidates in four states in 2000 illustrates the perceived importance of criminal justice issues to winning or maintaining judicial office.51 This study showed that candidates devoted over fiftytwo percent of their commercials to criminal justice issues, while
they devoted only twenty-four percent of their commercials to civil
justice issues.52 Judicial candidates understandably tailor their
campaigns to emphasize their anti-crime views or credentials given
that another study found an inverse relationship between the votes
received by an incumbent state supreme court candidate and the
state’s murder rate the previous year.53
46. E.g., Robert S. Thompson, Judicial Retention Elections and Judicial Method: A
Retrospective on the California Retention Election of 1986, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 2007
(1988).
47. E.g., Reid, supra note 28, at 70-71.
48. See, e.g., Joanna Cohn Weiss, Note, Tough on Crime: How Campaigns for State
Judiciary Violate Criminal Defendants’ Due Process Rights, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1101,
1103-09 (2006).
49. See, e.g., Jan Hoffman, A Prominent Judge Retires, Objecting to the Governor’s
Litmus Test, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1997, at 49; Peter Lewis, Rice Won’t Reappoint
Judge Who Ruled Girl Enticed Attacker, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 10, 1990, at A1.
50. See Hoffman, supra note 49, at 49.
51. See Anthony Champagne, Television Ads in Judicial Campaigns, 35 IND. L.
REV. 669, 677-78 (2002).
52. Id. at 678.
53. See Melinda Gann Hall, State Supreme Courts in American Democracy: Probing the Myths of Judicial Reform, 95 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 315, 324 (2001) [hereinafter
Melinda Gann Hall, State Supreme Courts in American Democracy].
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Some studies also suggest that judges’ desires to avoid being labeled as pro-criminal defendant influence their decisions in criminal cases. A study of trial judges in Pennsylvania found that the
judges tended to mete out harsher sentences to criminal defendants
as election day grew closer.54 Interestingly, the Pennsylvania
judges behaved strategically to diminish the possibility of defeat,
despite the fact that incumbent Pennsylvania judges run in retention elections at the end of each term55 in which judges are very
rarely rejected.56 This finding from the Pennsylvania trial courts
confirms the results of an earlier study involving selected supreme
court justices in Kentucky, Louisiana, North Carolina, and Texas,
with a record of supporting the claims of criminal defendants in a
majority of non-unanimous decisions.57 This study showed that
within two years of the next election, judges with generally procriminal defendant records were more likely to vote with the majority in upholding death sentences or the underlying conviction
predicating the death sentence.58
III.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The prior studies suggest that judges’ decisions in criminal cases
can play a pivotal role in determining retention when their terms
expire. Arguably, many judges perceive that being hard on
criminals is the “safest” political course of action to assure re-selection. Accordingly, examining rulings in criminal cases might suggest something about how public opinion, pressure from special
interest groups, and the opinions of political officials who control
their reselection influence judges.
Clearly, any inferences about judicial independence based on the
tendency of a judge to rule in favor of criminal defendants must be
made with care. I do not imply that a completely independent
judge would never rule in favor of the government in criminal
cases. Judges never compile perfectly anti-government records in
54. See Gregory A. Huber & Sanford C. Gordon, Accountability and Coercion: Is
Justice Blind When It Runs for Office?, 48 AM. J. POL. SCI. 247, 261-62 (2004).
55. Id. at 250.
56. For example, Hall reports that between 1980 and 1995 only 1.7 percent of supreme court justices who ran in the 234 retention elections during that period were
defeated, and that 2.6 percent received less than fifty-five percent of the vote. See
Melinda Gann Hall, State Supreme Courts in American Democracy, supra note 53, at
318-19.
57. Melinda Gann Hall, Electoral Politics and Strategic Voting in State Supreme
Courts, 54 J. POL. 427, 433-35 (1992) [hereinafter Melinda Gann Hall, Electoral
Politics].
58. Id. at 438-44.
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criminal cases because many different factors influence decisions in
these cases. These factors include case facts,59 victim characteristics,60 perpetrator characteristics,61 judges’ ideological preferences,62 and the political ideology of the state.63 Because of the
incentives that exist for judges to appear tough on criminals, however, any tendency to back the claims of the accused in criminal
cases may provide a rough and indirect indication of judicial freedom to make decisions that are politically unpopular.
A.

How the Supreme Court Decisions in Criminal Cases
Were Counted

Although the discussion up to this point focused on the motivation of individual judges to appear tough on crime, this study assumes that when judges vote together as a court, each judge retains
an incentive to appear tough on criminals in order to secure
reselection. Of course, different judges on a court might tend to
favor the state more often in criminal cases in some circumstances
than others, such as when a judge’s term is nearing its end.64 This
study assumes that the desire to secure reselection creates an incentive for all judges to appear tough on crime. Furthermore, focusing on the outcome of cases, as opposed to focusing on the votes
of individual judges, illustrates whether differences in appointment
systems actually affect the fate of criminally accused and convicted
persons who come before the states’ highest courts.
The study examines cases decided by supreme courts in Alaska,
Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Maine, Massachusetts, New Jersey,
Rhode Island, Tennessee, and Utah between 2000 and 2003. These
states represent the geographical and political diversity of the
country65 and the state appointment systems used to select their
59. See Paul R. Brace & Melinda Gann Hall, The Interplay of Preferences, Case
Facts, Context and Rules in the Politics of Judicial Choice, 59 J. POL. 1206, 1223 (1997).
60. Id.
61. See Huber & Gordon, supra note 54, at 255.
62. See Paul Brace, Laura Langer & Melinda Gann Hall, Measuring the Preferences of State Supreme Court Judges, 62 J. POL. 387, 398-409 (2000).
63. Brace & Hall, supra note 59, at 1221.
64. See, e.g., Melinda Gann Hall, Electoral Politics, supra note 57.
65. For example, the Democratic presidential candidate won CT, HI, MA, ME,
NJ, and RI in 2000 and 2004, while the Republican presidential candidate won AK,
CO, TN, and UT in those years. See Fed. Election Comm’n, 2000 Official General
Presidential Election Results, http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/2000presgeresults.htm (last
visited Nov. 27, 2006); CNN.com, 2004 Presidential Election Results, http://www.cnn
.com/ELECTION/2004/pages/results/ (last visited Nov. 27, 2006).
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high court judges differ in important ways.66 This study examines
state supreme court decisions in criminal cases brought on direct
appeal, or by way of habeas corpus, and includes interlocutory appeals and final decisions in published cases.67 When courts consolidated multiple cases, the outcome for each case in the group was
counted separately because each of the cases possibly had a different outcome. This study excludes decisions on whether to grant
leave to appeal, motions for reconsideration or rehearing, and unpublished decisions. Unpublished cases were excluded because of
the difficulty of accessing such cases, and because they lack precedential value in all jurisdictions.68 Furthermore, published decisions present, arguably, the most legally and politically influential
products of appellate courts.69 The study omitted cases in which
lower court judges participated in judicial deliberations because
these judges are sometimes chosen by different selection commissions,70 and sometimes serve different terms of office from supreme court judges in the same state.71 Finally, the study omitted
cases in which retired supreme court judges sat by assignment because those judges no longer face reselection and might not be as
concerned with relations between the court and the other branches
of state government or public opinion as justices actively serving
on the court.
Note also that a case was coded as being won by the state if the
criminally accused or convicted party in the case was not granted
the primary relief sought. For example, if a person appealed her
convictions for auto theft and murder, and only the auto theft conviction was reversed on appeal, the case was coded as a state win
because she failed to get all of the convictions overturned.
B.

Significance of Selected Features of Appointment Systems

The study looks at how the following features of appointment
systems are associated with the propensity of courts to decide cases
66. For a comprehensive description of the judicial selection system that each of
these states uses for its supreme court, see Am. Judicature Soc’y, Judicial Selection in
the States, supra note 2.
67. The cases were gathered from the Lexis-Nexis online database using word
searches for published criminal and habeas corpus cases.
68. See J. Thomas Sullivan, Unpublished Opinions and No Citation Rules in the
Trial Courts, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 419, 422 (2005).
69. See Susan B. Haire, Stefanie A. Lindquist & Donald R. Songer, Appellate
Court Supervision in the Federal Judiciary: A Hierarchical Perspective, 37 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 143, 156 n.9 (2003).
70. See AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, CURRENT STATUS, supra note 20, at 3-6.
71. See AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, JUDICIAL SELECTION, supra note 1, at 7-14.
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in favor of the state: 1) whether a court’s justices are selected using
a merit selection commission, 2) whether a state subjects its supreme court judges to reselection, and 3) the length of the terms
served by justices on a supreme court.
An association between one feature of an appointment system
and court decisions in criminal cases can be found by taking the
mean percentage of criminal cases decided in favor of the state by
a group of courts with the feature in question and comparing it
with the mean percentage of criminal cases decided in favor of the
state by a group of courts without the feature. The difference in
the mean percentages is then tested for statistical significance.72
C.

Limitations of the Study

It is important to note some of the limitations of this study
before explaining the results. Because the study does not include
unpublished decisions, or decisions about whether to review cases
from a lower court, it is not a comprehensive examination of the
features of appointment systems associated with courts’ decisional
propensities in every type of decision that courts make.73 Furthermore, this study does not examine the factors that influence which
candidate a governor chooses to nominate, and it does not control
for a host of issues that could affect the outcome of cases, such as
the ideology of the justices who decide a case and the facts and the
law at issue in the case. This inquiry merely compares the decisions
of state supreme courts when certain appointment system features
are present, and when they are not. The goal is to see if any systematic differences in the outcomes of criminal cases exist based on
how a court’s judges were chosen and retained. This analytical
technique provides some clues as to whether these features impact
court decision-making.
As indicated earlier, no research analyzed which features of appointment systems are associated with which decisional propensi72. The level of significance measures the certainty that an estimate represents a
hypothesized value, which in this case is the difference between the proportion of
cases decided by courts with one appointment system feature and those without the
feature. The lower the value, the more certain the difference between the two proportions is not zero. See JAY DEVORE & ROXY PECK, STATISTICS: THE EXPLORATION AND ANALYSIS OF DATA 309-11 (1986). For the purposes of this study,
significance levels over .95 do not represent a satisfactory level of certainty that there
is a difference between two proportions.
73. For a more complete discussion of the limitations of studies that focus on published opinions, see Barry Friedman, Taking Law Seriously, 4 PERSP. POL. 261, 271
(2006).
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ties among state supreme courts. A number of factors suggest
expectations as to what the results of this study might show. For
example, if supporters of merit selection commissions are correct
that such commissions select more independent and professional
judicial candidates,74 then courts whose justices were appointed using merit commissions should decide fewer criminal cases in favor
of the state on average than courts whose members were not selected with commissions. Furthermore, given that prior research
suggested that judges are increasingly likely to rule in favor of the
state in criminal cases as the end of their terms of office approach,75 one would expect that courts with judges who serve
longer terms and are not subject to reselection should rule in favor
of the state less often than courts in states where the justices serve
shorter terms or are subject to reselection.
IV. RESULTS
Table One presents a cross tabulation showing the percentage of
criminal cases in the study that each court decided for the state and
against the state:

74. See Carrington, supra note 10, at 95-97.
75. See Melinda Gann Hall, Electoral Politics, supra note 57, at 438-39; see generally Huber & Gordon, supra note 54.
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STATE

State Government
Loser

State Government
Winner

Totals

Alaska
No. of Cases
% of Alaska Cases

11
(36.7%)

19
(63.3%)

30
(100%)

Colorado
No. of Cases
% of Colorado Cases

48
(34.8%)

90
(65.2%)

138
(100%)

Connecticut
No. of Cases
% of Connecticut Cases

34
(20.4%)

133
(79.6%)

167
(100%)

Hawaii
No. of Cases
% of Hawaii Cases

33
(47.8%)

36
(52.2%)

69
(100%)

Maine
No. of Cases
% of Maine Cases

40
(28.0%)

103
(72.0%)

143
(100%)

Massachusetts
No. of Cases
% of Massachusetts Cases

90
(22.3%)

314
(77.7%)

404
(100%)

54
(45%)

66
(55%)

120
(100%)

Rhode Island
No. of Cases
% of Rhode Island Cases

25
(11.8%)

187
(88.2%)

212
(100%)

Tennessee
No. of Cases
% of Tennessee Cases

43
(37.1%)

73
(62.9%)

116
(100%)

Utah
No. of Cases
% of Utah Cases

13
(14.6%)

76
(85.4%)

89
(100%)

Totals
No. of Cases
% of Total Cases

391
(26.3%)

1097
(73.7%)

1488
(100%)

State

New Jersey
No. of Cases
% of New Jersey Cases

Table Two presents the results of difference-of-means tests, comparing the rulings of courts in criminal cases to ascertain whether
any differences in their rulings were associated with merit selection, term length, or the lack of reselection:

\\server05\productn\F\FUJ\34-1\FUJ112.txt

356

unknown

Seq: 14

4-APR-07

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

9:26

[Vol. XXXIV

TABLE TWO
DIFFERENCES IN STATE SUPREME COURT RULINGS WITH
DIFFERENT APPOINTMENT SYSTEM FEATURES
N

Means

Standard
Deviations

Difference of
Means Test*

Significance

1225
263

.76
.64

.429
.480

3.588

.000

Reselection
No Reselection

872
616

.68
.81

.465
.390

5.834

.000

Ten-Year Term
Less than Ten-Year Term

326
426

.68
.73

.468
.447

−1.405

.161

Appointment System Feature
Merit Commission
No Merit Commission

*Test does not assume equal variances.

Overall, the results were startling and counterintuitive. Specifically, the results show that courts whose members were selected
with the use of a merit selection commission decided a higher percentage of criminal cases in favor of the state than did courts chosen without the use of commissions.76 The results also show that
supreme courts whose justices do not face any sort of reselection
decided a higher percentage of criminal cases in favor of the state
than courts whose justices have to be reselected periodically.77
Surprisingly, no statistically significant difference existed between
the percentage of criminal cases decided in favor of the state by
courts whose justices serve ten-year terms of office and courts
whose justices serve shorter terms.78
V.

DISCUSSION

These findings provide a number of interesting insights and raise
a host of questions. The results regarding merit selection commissions suggest that there could be something happening in the selection process that causes the commissions to pick candidates who
76. All of the states in the study used merit selection commissions to select supreme court justices except New Jersey and Maine. See AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, JUDICIAL SELECTION, supra note 1, at 6.
77. Among the states in the study, Massachusetts and Rhode Island were the only
two that do not force their supreme court justices to face some form of reselection.
Id. at 10, 12.
78. Supreme court justices in the following states in the study serve ten-year
terms: Alaska, Colorado, Hawaii, and Utah. Id. at 7-8, 13. Supreme court justices in
Connecticut and Tennessee serve eight-year terms, while those in Maine serve sevenyear terms. Id. at 8, 10, 13. Supreme court justices in New Jersey serve an initial
seven-year term, but face no reselection if renominated by the governor and reconfirmed by the state senate at end of that term. Id. at 11. Because the justices of the
New Jersey Supreme Court do not face reselection at regularly recurring intervals, it
was excluded from the group of courts whose decisions were compared to see how
courts with different term lengths ruled in criminal cases.
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are more favorably disposed to the state in criminal cases and,
therefore, more likely to make politically safe and popular decisions against criminally accused and convicted litigants.
The results in Table Three present more detailed findings regarding the impact of merit selection commissions on court decisionmaking in the presence or absence of reselection. Table Three
shows that the use of reselection in conjunction with merit selection might mitigate the tendency to rule in favor of the state that
we see in judicial selection systems using merit commissions. Table
Three also shows that when one focuses only on states that use
some form of reselection, the use of a merit selection commission is
associated with a higher proportion of decisions in favor of the
state.
EFFECTS

OF

TABLE THREE
MERIT SELECTION COMMISSIONS
COURTS’ DECISIONS

Appointment System Feature
Merit Commission Without
Reselection
Merit Commission With
Reselection
Merit Commission With
Reselection
Reselection Without Merit
Commission

ON

N

Means

Standard
Deviations

Difference of
Means Test*

Significance

616

.81

.390

4.612

.000

609

.70

.458

609

.70

.458

1.676

.094

263

.64

.480

*Test does not assume equal variances.

The commissions’ tendency to exclude more candidates whom
they feel would not be sufficiently tough on criminals during the
selection process could be facilitated by the fact that most commissions are required to keep their deliberations, communications, interviews, records, and votes on the candidates strictly
confidential.79 Some committees are even prohibited from revealing to the public the identity of the candidates under
consideration.80
There is relatively little information available about the deliberations of judicial selection commissions, however, the data that exist
possibly reveal something about how the bias of commissions
against candidates who seem to be sympathetic to criminal defendants might manifest itself in commissions’ deliberations. For exam79. See AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, CURRENT STATUS, supra note 20, at 16-17.
80. Id.

R
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ple, in a survey of judicial selection commissioners in the 1970s,
forty-nine percent of the respondents said that “political considerations” came up in their evaluations of judicial candidates.81 The
survey also asked if one quality would set a candidate apart from
equally qualified peers. Of the 252 responses received by researchers, respondents mentioned “integrity” most frequently, while “judicial temperament” was tied for fourth, and “fairness” ranked
seventh.82 “Independence” tied for twentieth, falling below “a
likeable personality,” which tied for tenth.83 Other studies of judicial selection commissions also reveal that political considerations
play a significant and immeasurable role in the candidate evaluation process.84 Still, more research is needed into the nature of the
candidate evaluation process in which commissions engage, and
into the factors that influence governors when they decide which
candidates to nominate.
It is also unclear why states that do not subject their supreme
court justices to any type of reselection have courts that are friendlier to the state in criminal appeals than courts in states where the
supreme court justices are subject to reselection. The results in Table Four show that the proportion of cases that a state supreme
court decides for the state appears to be lower if its judges are subject to reselection, regardless of whether the reselection is by reappointment or retention election, than if its judges are not subject to
reselection. Table Four also shows, however, that there is no statistically significant difference in the proportion of cases decided in
favor of the state between courts in states that use retention elections and courts in states that use reappointment.

81. ALLAN ASHMAN & JAMES J. ALFINI, THE KEY TO JUDICIAL MERIT SELECTHE NOMINATING PROCESS 75 (1974).
82. Id. at 239-48.
83. Id.
84. See, e.g., JOANNE MARTIN, MERIT SELECTION COMMISSIONS: WHAT DO THEY
DO? HOW EFFECTIVE ARE THEY? 20-21 (1993); RICHARD A. WATSON & RONDAL G.
DOWNING, THE POLITICS OF THE BENCH AND THE BAR: JUDICIAL SELECTION UNDER
THE MISSOURI NONPARTISAN COURT PLAN 101-11 (1969).
TION:
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TABLE FOUR
RESELECTION ON COURTS’ DECISIONS
N

Means

Standard
Deviations

Difference of
Means Test*

Significance

Retention Election
No Reselection

373
616

.69
.81

.462
.390

−4.247

.000

Retention Election
Reselection by Reappointment

373
499

.69
.68

.462
.468

.451

.652

Reselection by Reappointment
No Reselection

499
616

.68
.81

.468
.390

5.192

.000

Appointment System Feature

*Test does not assume equal variances.

Protecting judges from the fear of losing their jobs because of
unpopular decisions has been touted as a way of enhancing their
independence.85 The results of this study suggest, however, that
courts enjoying security of tenure appear more reticent to make
potentially unpopular decisions by siding with criminal defendants
than courts that do not enjoy such security. This finding clearly
calls for more research into why security of tenure is associated
with courts that make fewer politically unpopular decisions by siding with the state, but one possibility suggests itself. Courts may
make decisions based on a host of reasons, including a desire to
maintain the respect and esteem of friends, colleagues, the public,
and the other branches of government.86 Accordingly, these judges
may be trying to protect their court budgets from cuts87 or to protect the court from legislators diminishing the court’s jurisdiction
because of the legislators’ displeasure with decisions favoring the
criminally accused.88 Also, researchers note the tendency of the
United States Supreme Court to match the public’s policy preferences with its rulings, despite the fact that its justices have life tenure, so that its rulings are not legislatively overturned or left
85. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Decision-Makers: In Defense of Courts, 71 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 109, 113-14 (1997).
86. See, e.g., J. W. PELTASON, FIFTY-EIGHT LONELY MEN: SOUTHERN FEDERAL
JUDGES AND SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 9-12 (1961); Julian Borger, Former Top Judge
Says U.S. Risks Edging Near to Dictatorship, THE GUARDIAN, Mar. 13, 2006, available
at http://www.guardian.co.uk/usa/story/0,,1729396,00.html (discussing a possible connection between violence against judges and judges’ decisions).
87. E.g., Gary M. Anderson, William F. Shughart II & Robert D. Tollison, On the
Incentives of Judges to Enforce Legislative Wealth Transfers, 32 J.L. & ECON. 215, 226
(1989); Eugenia Froedge Toma, Congressional Influence and the Supreme Court: The
Budget as a Signaling Device, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 131, 145-46 (1991).
88. See, e.g., Shirley S. Abrahamson, Judicial Independence as a Campaign Platform: The Importance of Fair and Impartial Courts, 84 MICH. B.J. 40, 42 (2005) [hereinafter Abrahamson, Judicial Independence].
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unenforced.89 Perhaps the same motives might prompt state supreme courts whose judges do not face tenure review to closely
track public opinion with their rulings.
Public opinion and threats from the other branches of government likewise exert pressure on courts that are subject to reselection, and more research is needed to find out why these pressures
possibly have a greater impact on courts that are not subject to
reselection. One explanation could be that reselection gives courts
an institutional legitimacy that encourages them to act more independently than courts whose judges do not serve with the direct
endorsement of the state’s voters, or who have to be reappointed
by an elected governor. Supporters of judicial election advanced
this argument regarding elections in the nineteenth century,90 and
Justice Larry Starcher of the West Virginia Supreme Court more
recently advanced the same argument.91 Furthermore, Justice Shirley Abrahamson of the Wisconsin Supreme Court suggested that
judicial elections enhance judicial independence because judicial
campaigns provide an opportunity for judges to educate the public
about the importance of an independent judiciary that is not present in systems where judges do not have to seek a public mandate.92 Although no research has been conducted on this specific
question, it could be that reappointment by the governor bolsters
courts’ independence in a manner similar to elections. Because
judges who must be reappointed can always claim that they hold
their offices with the endorsement of the state’s highest elected official, judges that do not face reselection cannot claim to be directly
accountable to the people or their elected leaders.
If the suggestion that reselection encourages judges to make
more unpopular decisions is correct, it could also be that legislators
and governors in states where judges are subject to reselection are
more restrained in punishing the judiciary by restricting its powers
or funds, or threatening such restrictions. In retention election
states, this restraint could be because elections provide judges with
an independent source of legitimacy and political clout that judges
in states without retention elections do not enjoy. On the other
89. See, e.g, Roy B. Flemming & B. Dan Wood, The Public and the Supreme
Court: Individual Justice Responsiveness to American Policy Moods, 41 AM. J. POL.
SCI. 468, 493-94 (1997).
90. See generally Kermit L. Hall, The Judiciary on Trial, supra note 7.
91. See Larry V. Starcher, Choosing West Virginia Judges, 20 QUINNIPIAC L. REV.
767, 769-70 (2001).
92. See Shirley S. Abrahamson, The Ballot and the Bench, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 973,
990 (2001); Abrahamson, Judicial Independence, supra note 88, at 41-42.
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hand, in reappointment states, the restraint could come from the
fact that the governor and/or the state legislature do not feel the
need to punish the courts with jurisdictional restrictions or budget
cuts because they can always remove judges whose decisions they
dislike, thereby changing the court’s composition.
The results in Table Three suggest the possibly independenceenhancing effect of reselection. The results show that reselection
might provide a “counter-weight” to the use of merit selection
commissions in the selection process. Reselection might act as a
counter-weight by emboldening judges to make more unpopular
decisions, despite the fact that they might have been chosen in part
because of the belief that they would be biased in favor of the state
in criminal cases.
Another interesting finding is that the type of reselection that a
state uses for its high court does not appear to affect how often that
court ruled in favor of the state. This suggests that justices who
must run in retention elections are no more afraid of losing their
jobs than justices who must be reappointed. This finding is consistent with the evidence regarding the danger that judges can find
themselves in for “pro-criminal” decisions in both systems. Also,
the fact that there is no statistically significant difference in the
proportion of cases in which the state won that were decided by
courts with ten-year terms and those with terms of less than ten
years is also somewhat surprising. This suggests that there might
not be a relationship between how long justices serve and how a
court rules in criminal cases, as long as the justices are subject to
some form of reselection. This finding does not refute the conclusions of previous studies93 indicating that individual judges tend to
favor the state more as their terms draw to an end. Given that the
justices on state supreme courts serve staggered terms, it would appear that the absolute length of the terms that they serve do not
affect the outcome of the decisions they render together.
VI.

CONCLUSION

This study reports surprising findings about the tendency of state
supreme courts to support the state in criminal cases when comparing the different features of the appointment systems used to select
the judges. Above all, this study’s results suggest that merit selection might not achieve one of its most important goals: an indepen93. See generally Melinda Gann Hall, Electoral Politics, supra note 57; Huber &
Gordon, supra note 54.
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dent judiciary. Furthermore, the results suggest that subjecting
judges to reselection might actually increase their independence,
rather than reduce it. In addition, the type of reselection that a
state employs, as well as the length of the judicial term, might not
be as important to judicial independence as once thought. The results further suggest that forces outside of the normal appointment
and reselection process might influence courts’ decision-making,
specifically in the form of implied or explicit threats from the legislative and executive branches of government to the authority of the
judiciary. Judges might take such threats more seriously, or they
might receive such threats more often, in states without reselection.
These results also point to the urgent need for more research
into how different features of appointment systems affect judicial
decisions. Future research should employ analysis techniques to
isolate the effects that these features might have on how courts
decide cases by controlling for other factors that might affect the
outcome of a case (such factors include the overall ideological
complexion of the court, the facts and the law at issue in the case,
and the crime rate in the state). Such studies, involving more
courts and a wider variety of cases, will provide a better and more
nuanced understanding of how different appointment system features impact court decision-making.
Studies of the judicial selection processes in several states might
shed light on how merit selection commissions vet and select judicial candidates, and how reselection might empower judges to be
more independent and have less fear of making unpopular decisions. This research is vital to understanding how the judicial selection process affects the independence of the courts, whose strength
and impartiality have important implications for the maintenance
of the rule of law.

